zomato-sushinpm
Malicious code in zomato-sushi (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a preinstall script that runs curl with form-encoded fields carrying the installer's hostname (hostname -f), whoami, current working directory, and a base64-encoded dump of the entire process environment (env | base64 -w0) over plain HTTP to an Interactsh/OAST out-of-band collector at d8s0b82plbq3u5sb2vo0sb3a9obr4yjt7.oast.site. A preuninstall hook beacons the same host. This fires automatically on npm install with no user opt-in. The bulk environment dump captures any secrets present in the shell at install time, including CI tokens, NPM_TOKEN, AWS_* keys, and similar credentials. The package name mimics Zomato's design system namespace and the shipped index.js is a stub with no functionality, consistent with a reconnaissance/credential-capture lure rather than a real library.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'zomato-sushi' @ 1.0.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
-
The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
-
The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for zomato-sushi (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging zomato-sushi across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
zomato-sushi is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If zomato-sushi was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks zomato-sushi before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks zomato-sushi-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.