What does the zod-pino malware do?

The package is published under a name suggesting a Pino logger integration for Zod, but the tarball contents do not match that purpose and exhibit multiple installer-harm fingerprints: - scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs runs at install time and performs outbound network activity (GET requests, ping/host probing, identifier collection). A logging-schema package has no legitimate reason to ship a postinstall agent that beacons out. - dist/discordRelayUpload.js implements POST-based upload flows with base64 encoding/decoding of payloads and host-reachability probes (ping) — a Discord-channel relay used for off-host data delivery, unrelated to the package's advertised purpose. - dist/secretScan/co

Which versions of zod-pino are malicious?

The following npm versions of zod-pino are flagged malicious: 1.0.122, 1.0.123, 1.0.124, 1.0.126. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate zod-pino if I installed it?

zod-pino is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed zod-pino — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If zod-pino was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is zod-pino part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — zod-pino is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-007184, IN-MAL-2026-007251, IN-MAL-2026-007252, IN-MAL-2026-007332 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find zod-pino across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for zod-pino (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging zod-pino across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

zod-pinonpm

Malicious code in zod-pino (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6273

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall zod-pino

What this malware does

The package is published under a name suggesting a Pino logger integration for Zod, but the tarball contents do not match that purpose and exhibit multiple installer-harm fingerprints:

scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs runs at install time and performs outbound network activity (GET requests, ping/host probing, identifier collection). A logging-schema package has no legitimate reason to ship a postinstall agent that beacons out.
dist/discordRelayUpload.js implements POST-based upload flows with base64 encoding/decoding of payloads and host-reachability probes (ping) — a Discord-channel relay used for off-host data delivery, unrelated to the package's advertised purpose.
dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js and dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js implement a secret-scanning routine that fetches huggingface.co endpoints from an 'agent startup audit' code path, with base64 buffer handling consistent with credential extraction and transmission.
dist/hfCredentials.js handles base64-encoded Hugging Face credentials, and dist/deploymentDefaults.js plus scripts/encode-deployment.mjs perform multi-stage base64 decoding of deployment payloads — typical staged-payload obfuscation.
dist/relayServer.js bundles a long-lived relay/server component with repeated host-probe (ping) primitives.

Taken together — install-time agent with outbound traffic, secret-scanning + credential modules, base64-staged deployment payloads, and a Discord upload relay, all in a package nominally advertised as a zod/pino integration — the shipped behavior matches an exfiltration/relay toolchain rather than a logging utility. Installing this package triggers the postinstall agent automatically.

Malicious versions

4 flagged

1.0.1221.0.1231.0.1241.0.126

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

94af4e18fa0fdc7c6aa17842c0dcea9d8ac7632a915cedb0d2150470d07c4e02

e4ffd3391bd641307fbb18b050f374e75476dd1ab9ed063d88cfec46dbb70ff1

81e8a23a71a5288646495c50a46c2814ffc0668d9c24ed04e1abd9e8758b5ea2

c536e5a7ee3d5542e1ac822b30ba4525e52b2ae0c964d0c2470468d91b9b41c8

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for zod-pino (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging zod-pino across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
zod-pino is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If zod-pino was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks zod-pino before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. zod-pino on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.122, 1.0.123, 1.0.124, 1.0.126 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-007184IN-MAL-2026-007251IN-MAL-2026-007252IN-MAL-2026-007332

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks zod-pino-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring