zest-productnpm
Malicious code in zest-product (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, postinstall.js collects host identity and environment data (os.hostname(), username, process.cwd(), process.env values, plus shelled-out whoami/hostname/id via child_process.execSync) and ships it over the network. Outbound destinations include https://app.interactsh.com (an out-of-band interaction service commonly used for blind-exfiltration / SSRF beacons) and http://lululemon.jfrog.io (a JFrog endpoint referenced by hardcoded URL — consistent with a dependency-confusion attack targeting Lululemon's internal package namespace). Collected data is base64-encoded (Buffer.from(...).toString('base64')) before transmission via https.request. index.js additionally constructs a curl -X POST command interpolating $(whoami), $(hostname), and id and runs it via child_process.exec. The 99.9.0 version number combined with the lululemon.jfrog.io reference is the canonical dependency-confusion fingerprint: publish a public package with a name matching an internal one and a high version to win resolution. Installer harm: identity, environment variables, working-directory contents, and internal-network reachability data are leaked to attacker-controlled infrastructure on every install.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for zest-product (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging zest-product across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
zest-product is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If zest-product was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks zest-product before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks zest-product-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.