zer0onetencent2npm
zer0onetencent2 is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10945) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in zer0onetencent2 (npm)
What this malware does
The zer0onetencent2 package was published to the npm registry by user 't2423048543' (maintainer email [email protected]). It is described as 'A simple date formatting utility' but ships no such functionality; index.js only exports a hello() stub returning the package name, indicating a package created to deliver an install-time payload.
The package.json declares a postinstall hook ("node postinstall.js") that runs automatically at npm install time. The bundled postinstall.js embeds a shell command chain that performs cloud-metadata SSRF and credential/environment harvesting: it queries a public IP echo service (http://cip.cc), probes a Meituan/Sankuai internal SSRF test endpoint (https://mtsrc-test.sankuai.com/ssrf), requests AWS EC2 instance metadata credentials for the IAM role 'sandyclaw-canary-worker-role' (http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/sandyclaw-canary-worker-role), and reads Tencent Cloud metadata (http://metadata.tencentyun.com/latest/meta-data/ and http://169.254.0.23/latest/meta-data/). It then reads the installing process's environment via /proc/self/environ and exfiltrates the concatenated output, together with a directory listing of /data/, by HTTP POST to the attacker-controlled Burp Collaborator endpoint http://kuir5t6qdp277zbqsg4bo7x4bvhm5dt2.oastify.com (paths /metadata and /data).
As shipped, the malicious command chain is stored inside postinstall.js as a JSON document (a copy of a package manifest) rather than as executable JavaScript, so the 'node postinstall.js' hook raises a syntax error and the embedded payload does not execute as-published; the intent and payload are nonetheless unambiguously malicious. A sibling package (zer0onetencent) by the same maintainer carries an identical payload differing only in the Collaborator subdomain.
The package's postinstall.js lifecycle script runs automatically on npm install and performs credential harvesting against the installer's host or CI environment. It curls the AWS instance metadata service at 169.254.169.254 to retrieve IAM role credentials (writing them to /tmp/aws.txt), queries the Tencent Cloud metadata endpoint at metadata.tencentyun.com, probes an internal Meituan SSRF target, and reads /proc/self/environ to capture all process environment variables. The aggregated contents are POSTed with curl -X POST -d to http://kuir5t6qdp277zbqsg4bo7x4bvhm5dt2.oastify.com/metadata, a Burp Collaborator (oastify.com) attacker-controlled sink. A second POST exfiltrates a directory listing of /data/. Installing this package on a machine with cloud metadata reachability or CI secrets in the environment leaks IAM temporary credentials and environment secrets to a third-party attacker collector.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for zer0onetencent2 (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging zer0onetencent2 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
zer0onetencent2 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If zer0onetencent2 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks zer0onetencent2 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks zer0onetencent2-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.