zenith-utilsnpm
Malicious code in zenith-utils (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package name is zenith-utils but the tarball is a verbatim copy of the nodemailer source tree (lib/nodemailer.js as main, lib/smtp-transport, lib/ses-transport, lib/dkim, lib/mail-composer, etc.; package.json author set to nodemailer's real maintainer 'Andris Reinman'). package.json declares postinstall: node lib/utils/index.js, which uses spawn with detached: true, stdio: ['ignore','ignore','ignore'], and child.unref() to launch lib/utils/smtp-connection/index.js as a hidden background process that survives the npm install command. That process forks lib/utils/smtp-connection/worker.js, which polls https://jsonkeeper.com/b/WDH3V in an infinite loop and executes the returned cookie field via new Function('require', r.data.cookie)(require). jsonkeeper.com is an anonymous, mutable paste host — the author can change the served payload at any time, granting arbitrary Node-privileged code execution on every machine that has installed the package. The detached/unref'd spawn is deliberately designed to hide the activity from npm's lifecycle logs while the eval loop runs persistently in the background.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for zenith-utils (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging zenith-utils across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove zenith-utils from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If zenith-utils was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks zenith-utils before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks zenith-utils-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.