wml-componentsnpm

[email protected] declares preinstall: node poc.js in package.json, so npm install automatically runs poc.js with no consent step. poc.js iterates process.env and captures every variable whose name matches credential-shaped prefixes (TOKEN, AWS, AZURE, NPM, GITHUB, GITLAB, CI_, JENKINS, WALMART, WMT, BUILD, PROJECT, REPO, etc.) with full values, runs host-recon commands (ip a/ipconfig /all, id/whoami /all, os.hostname(), os.platform()), and walks up the directory tree reading the parent project's package.json and CI configuration (.gitlab-ci.yml, .github/workflows, Jenkinsfile, azure-pipelines.yml). The collected bundle is POSTed over HTTPS to a hardcoded interactsh out-of-band callback host (d8a5d9pon5bugoc35cngp9hcregcqyezu.oast.me, poc.js:11 and poc.js:113). The package's main is an empty object — it provides no functionality and exists only to execute the exfiltration payload. The name and version ([email protected]) are shaped as a dependency-confusion lure against an internal Walmart wml-* namespace, with the high version number designed to win resolution over the legitimate internal package. Although the package description claims authorized bug-bounty testing, any developer or CI system outside the intended scope that resolves this name (mistyped dependency, public-mirror automation, untargeted CI) leaks credentials, source-tree metadata, and host identifiers to the attacker-controlled OAST endpoint.