wm-mappernpm
Malicious code in wm-mapper (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] is an empty stub (index.js is 35 bytes exporting {}, no description, no author) published at an artificially high version (99.9.1) consistent with dependency-confusion attacks against an internal package of the same name. Its package.json declares its sole runtime dependency as a direct HTTPS tarball URL — "ltidisafe": "https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-2.7.5.tgz" — bypassing the npm registry entirely. The path segment literally contains depenconf (dependency confusion). On npm install, npm fetches that tarball from an anonymous Google Cloud Storage bucket and executes any lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/postinstall) it declares. The bucket contents are not vetted by the registry, are mutable server-side after publication, and the bucket owner has no apparent affiliation with the host package. The host package's only effect on installers is to drag arbitrary, swappable, attacker-controlled code into the install tree.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'wm-mapper' @ 99.9.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for wm-mapper (version 99.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging wm-mapper across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove wm-mapper from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If wm-mapper was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks wm-mapper before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks wm-mapper-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.