webservices.rest-utilsnpm

package.json declares both preinstall and postinstall hooks that execute index.js, which exfiltrates installer data to a base64-encoded Cloudflare Worker destination (openmrs-sol-dev-v2.lapxa354.workers.dev). The payload includes hostname, username, network interfaces, /etc/resolv.conf,.git/HEAD, ~40 CI/CD environment variables (GITHUB_, GITLAB_, AWS_, CIRCLE_, BUILDKITE_, VERCEL_, etc.), recursively walked package.json metadata,.npmrc registry/scope hints, and presence indicators for ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker, ~/.npmrc, ~/.gitconfig, shell histories. When cloud env-var probes match, the script contacts the cloud metadata IP (encoded as decimal 2852039166 == 169.254.169.254) to harvest live AWS IMDSv2 IAM tokens, GCP service-account access tokens, and Azure managed-identity tokens — first 40 characters of each are appended to the exfil. It additionally performs DNS reconnaissance against ~25 internal hostnames (kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local, vault.internal, consul.service.consul, gitlab.local, jenkins.local, ec2.internal, rancher.internal, etc.) for lateral-movement targeting. package.json declares 11 bin aliases — webpack, vite, tsc, eslint, jest, gulp, next, turbo, prettier, tsnode — all pointing at the same malicious index.js, so every subsequent invocation of those common dev commands re-triggers the exfiltrator while forwarding to the real tool to mask the hijack. Obfuscation (base64 destination, decimal-encoded metadata IP, MalekAbuLialaResearch/1.0 cover User-Agent, [Webpack-Debug-MAB-v1] log label) confirms intent.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.