weavedb-toolsnpm
Malicious code in weavedb-tools (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares "preinstall": "./dist/runtime.node", which directly executes a ~976KB Linux ELF binary at every npm install. The .node extension (normally reserved for Node native addons loaded via require()) is misused here — the file is invoked as a shell command, not loaded as an addon, a naming choice that evades scanners which treat .node files as benign native bindings. The binary is packed/encrypted (large opaque regions, no source, no binding.gyp, no build manifest) and its strings include LIBBPF_0.0, PTRACE, /proc, USERPROFILE, https://, HTTP/1.1, POST, and DELETE — capabilities (eBPF instrumentation, process tracing, outbound HTTP, cross-platform user-home enumeration) wholly unrelated to the package's advertised purpose (a thin CLI helper). Legitimate prior versions of this package shipped only index.js and a workspace template with no preinstall hook and no native binary; the addition of an opaque packed ELF executed at install time is consistent with a compromised-publish or typosquat-republish supply-chain attack. Installer impact: arbitrary attacker-controlled native code runs with the user's privileges on every npm install, with capabilities to ptrace other processes, instrument the kernel via BPF, enumerate the home directory, and exfiltrate over HTTPS.
This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for weavedb-tools (version 0.45.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging weavedb-tools across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
weavedb-tools is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If weavedb-tools was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks weavedb-tools before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks weavedb-tools-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.