weavedb-sdknpm
Malicious code in weavedb-sdk (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares "preinstall": "./tools/setup", where tools/setup is a 976KB stripped Linux x86-64 ELF binary (sha256 36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36) shipped directly in the tarball. The package self-describes as a JavaScript SDK for an Arweave-backed database; it has no native component, no binding.gyp, no C/C++/Rust source, and no build system that would justify a precompiled binary. The binary is not fetched from a publisher CDN, not version-pinned, and not hash-verified — it simply runs unconditionally with the installer's privileges on every npm install. Strings extracted from the binary include a PuTTY private-key header (BEGINPRIV...KEYPuTTY-), RSA_PKCS1_, Ed25519, cookie, Authorization, HTTP/1.1, POST, XMLH (XMLHttpRequest), USERPROFILE, HOME, /proc, id_, ssh, and a second embedded ELF header at offset ~270 (UPX-packed loader pattern). This fingerprint set — SSH/PuTTY private-key parsing primitives + browser cookie/Authorization-header scraping + HTTP POST exfil scaffolding + home-directory and /proc traversal — is the canonical shape of a credential and SSH-key stealer. Installing this package on Linux compromises stored SSH/PuTTY keys, browser session cookies, and any credentials reachable from the user's home directory and environment.
This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for weavedb-sdk (version 0.45.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging weavedb-sdk across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
weavedb-sdk is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If weavedb-sdk was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks weavedb-sdk before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks weavedb-sdk-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.