weavedb-node-clientnpm
Malicious code in weavedb-node-client (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares "preinstall": "./tools/setup", unconditionally executing a 976KB UPX-packed, stripped Linux x86 ELF on every npm install. The package advertises itself as a thin pure-JS WeaveDB gRPC client (a single weavedb.proto and a ~150-line index.js) and has no native build requirement: no binding.gyp, no C/C++/Rust source, no documented native dependency, and no README mention of the shipped binary. Strings extracted from tools/setup indicate capabilities consistent with a credential-stealer / process-introspection payload: LIBBPF_0.0 and ~PTRACE (eBPF / ptrace primitives), USERPROFILE (Windows home-directory traversal), 2022-11-28 (GitHub REST API-Version header), RSA_PKCS1_ and Ed25519 (key handling), and HTTP/1.1 with POST / DELETE verbs. The shape — opaque packed binary, no matching source, advertised purpose mismatch, executed at npm lifecycle, with capability strings for GitHub tokens and home-directory secrets — is the canonical generic-binary-runner-dropper. Any developer or CI system running npm install weavedb-node-client on Linux will execute this attacker-controlled native code with their user privileges.
This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for weavedb-node-client (version 0.45.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging weavedb-node-client across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
weavedb-node-client is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If weavedb-node-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks weavedb-node-client before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks weavedb-node-client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.