weavedb-litenpm
Malicious code in weavedb-lite (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares "preinstall": "./src/deps.ts", but src/deps.ts is not TypeScript — its first bytes are the ELF magic (\x7fELF\x02\x01\x01), identifying it as a ~954 KB Linux x86-64 executable (sha256 36abd242…b436d36). Renaming a native binary with a .ts extension is deliberate disguise to evade reviewers and scanners. Running npm install weavedb-lite on Linux directly executes this opaque binary on the installer's machine before any other code runs, with no source, no documented purpose, no version pin, and no integrity verification. Extracted strings include HTTP/POST and https:// indicators consistent with network exfiltration or C2 callback, but the binary's actual behavior cannot be inspected statically. Additionally, the package name weavedb-lite mimics the WeaveDB ecosystem and declares bin entries (wao, wao-esm) that collide with the legitimate wao package it also depends on, fitting a typosquat/namespace-abuse pattern targeting developers searching for WeaveDB or wao tooling. The preinstall ELF execution alone is sufficient to block; the typosquat shape corroborates intentional impersonation.
This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for weavedb-lite (version 0.1.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging weavedb-lite across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
weavedb-lite is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If weavedb-lite was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks weavedb-lite before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks weavedb-lite-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.