weavedb-litenpm

package.json declares "preinstall": "./src/deps.ts", but src/deps.ts is not TypeScript — its first bytes are the ELF magic (\x7fELF\x02\x01\x01), identifying it as a ~954 KB Linux x86-64 executable (sha256 36abd242…b436d36). Renaming a native binary with a .ts extension is deliberate disguise to evade reviewers and scanners. Running npm install weavedb-lite on Linux directly executes this opaque binary on the installer's machine before any other code runs, with no source, no documented purpose, no version pin, and no integrity verification. Extracted strings include HTTP/POST and https:// indicators consistent with network exfiltration or C2 callback, but the binary's actual behavior cannot be inspected statically. Additionally, the package name weavedb-lite mimics the WeaveDB ecosystem and declares bin entries (wao, wao-esm) that collide with the legitimate wao package it also depends on, fitting a typosquat/namespace-abuse pattern targeting developers searching for WeaveDB or wao tooling. The preinstall ELF execution alone is sufficient to block; the typosquat shape corroborates intentional impersonation.

This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.