weavedb-exm-sdk-webnpm
Malicious code in weavedb-exm-sdk-web (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares "preinstall": "./bin/install-deps", which runs a 976KB UPX-packed Linux x86 ELF binary on every npm install. The package self-describes as a pure-JavaScript 'Web Client for WeaveDB' — its index.js is a ~60-line HTTP wrapper around https://${functionId}.exm.run — with no native build step, no shipped C/C++/Rust source, and no purpose-aligned reason to ship or execute a Linux binary at install time. The binary carries the UPX runtime-unpacker signature (http://upx.sf.net at offset ~4574) so its actual payload is compressed and not statically reviewable; visible string fragments reference PTRACE (process tracing), libbpf (kernel packet filtering), HTTP client primitives, and GitHub API headers — capabilities entirely unrelated to a WeaveDB JS HTTP client. There is no hash/signature verification, no version pinning, no documentation of the binary's presence in the README, and the file is staged under a generic 'install-deps' cover name. Installer impact: any npm install weavedb-exm-sdk-web on a Linux host (developer machines, CI runners) executes attacker-controlled, process-privileged native code with capabilities (ptrace, eBPF) suitable for credential theft, process injection, and host-level surveillance, before any application code is loaded.
This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for weavedb-exm-sdk-web (version 0.7.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging weavedb-exm-sdk-web across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
weavedb-exm-sdk-web is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If weavedb-exm-sdk-web was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks weavedb-exm-sdk-web before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks weavedb-exm-sdk-web-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.