weavedb-exm-sdknpm
Malicious code in weavedb-exm-sdk (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares "preinstall": "./vendor/setup", causing every npm install weavedb-exm-sdk to execute vendor/setup — a 976,568-byte Linux x86 ELF that is UPX-packed (the http://upx.sf.net self-decompressor banner is present at offset ~4574). The package's advertised purpose is a pure-JS WeaveDB/EXM SDK that wraps @execution-machine/sdk, arweave, and ramda; the source tree contains no native code, no binding.gyp, no node-gyp build, and no documented reason to ship a Linux native binary. Strings recovered from the binary's tail include LIBBPF, PTRACE, NETLINK, HTTP/1.1, POST, https://, and USERPROFILE — capabilities (eBPF/ptrace/network) that a JavaScript SDK has no need for. UPX packing of an install-time payload is an intentional anti-analysis measure: the executable bytes are not auditable from the source tree. This is a textbook opaque-binary dropper at preinstall time — the installer runs attacker-controlled native code on every npm install, with no hash verification, no purpose match, and no transparency.
This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for weavedb-exm-sdk (version 0.7.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging weavedb-exm-sdk across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
weavedb-exm-sdk is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If weavedb-exm-sdk was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks weavedb-exm-sdk before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks weavedb-exm-sdk-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.