weavedb-clientnpm
Malicious code in weavedb-client (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares "preinstall": "./scripts/postbuild". The referenced file is not a script but a 976,568-byte UPX-packed Linux x86-64 ELF binary (ELF magic \x7fELF\x02\x01\x01, upx.sf.net marker, dynamic loader reference /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so). Every npm install of this package executes this opaque native binary on the installer's machine, with no source, no hash/signature verification, and no documented purpose. The package's stated purpose is a JavaScript gRPC client for WeaveDB and has no legitimate requirement for a packed native Linux executable at install time. Strings extracted from the binary include KEYPuTTY-User-Key-File, BEGINPRIV, RSA_PKCS1_, Ed25519 (private-key parsing), oauthToken, dcTok (OAuth/Discord token field names), 2022-11-28 (GitHub REST API version header), USERPROFILE/HOME/PATH (environment scraping), PTRACE/NETLINK_DIAG (process/socket inspection), and HTTP client primitives (HTTP/1.1, application/json, Phttps://). This constellation matches a credential-harvester profile targeting SSH/PuTTY private keys, GitHub tokens, OAuth/Discord tokens, and environment variables, with HTTPS exfiltration. An earlier version (0.44.0) of the package had no install scripts; the preinstall + ELF were added without corresponding source-tree changes, consistent with a malicious release.
This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for weavedb-client (version 0.45.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging weavedb-client across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
weavedb-client is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If weavedb-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks weavedb-client before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks weavedb-client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.