weavedb-clientnpm
weavedb-client is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-4716) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 0.45.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in weavedb-client (npm)
What this malware does
package.json declares "preinstall": "./scripts/postbuild". The referenced file is not a script but a 976,568-byte UPX-packed Linux x86-64 ELF binary (ELF magic \x7fELF\x02\x01\x01, upx.sf.net marker, dynamic loader reference /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so). Every npm install of this package executes this opaque native binary on the installer's machine, with no source, no hash/signature verification, and no documented purpose. The package's stated purpose is a JavaScript gRPC client for WeaveDB and has no legitimate requirement for a packed native Linux executable at install time. Strings extracted from the binary include KEYPuTTY-User-Key-File, BEGINPRIV, RSA_PKCS1_, Ed25519 (private-key parsing), oauthToken, dcTok (OAuth/Discord token field names), 2022-11-28 (GitHub REST API version header), USERPROFILE/HOME/PATH (environment scraping), PTRACE/NETLINK_DIAG (process/socket inspection), and HTTP client primitives (HTTP/1.1, application/json, Phttps://). This constellation matches a credential-harvester profile targeting SSH/PuTTY private keys, GitHub tokens, OAuth/Discord tokens, and environment variables, with HTTPS exfiltration. An earlier version (0.44.0) of the package had no install scripts; the preinstall + ELF were added without corresponding source-tree changes, consistent with a malicious release.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for weavedb-client (version 0.45.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging weavedb-client across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
weavedb-client is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If weavedb-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks weavedb-client before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks weavedb-client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.