Which versions of wdb-sdk are malicious?

The following npm versions of wdb-sdk are flagged malicious: 0.1.2. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate wdb-sdk if I installed it?

wdb-sdk is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed wdb-sdk — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If wdb-sdk was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is wdb-sdk part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — wdb-sdk is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004818, IN-MAL-2026-004837 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find wdb-sdk across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for wdb-sdk (version 0.1.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging wdb-sdk across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

wdb-sdknpm

Malicious code in wdb-sdk (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4714

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall wdb-sdk

What this malware does

package.json declares "preinstall": "./dist/runtime.node", causing npm to spawn the shipped file as an executable on every install on Linux. Despite the .node extension (which would normally indicate a Node-API addon loaded via require()), the file is a 976KB stripped/packed ELF binary, not a native addon — Node addons are never spawned as processes. The binary contains strings indicating network I/O (HTTP/1.1, POST, https://), host enumeration (USERPROFILE, /lib64, linux-x86), kernel/eBPF and ptrace primitives (LIBBPF_0.0, PTRACE), and modern crypto (RSA/Ed25519/X448/MLKEM), with packed/obfuscated fragments. The package ships no source, no binding.gyp, no node-gyp/prebuild-install/node-pre-gyp scaffolding, no checksum, and no version-pinned publisher-hosted release URL — none of the legitimate native-addon shape. The .node filename is a deliberate disguise to make the executable look like a benign addon. Any developer or CI system running npm install wdb-sdk on Linux executes this attacker-controlled binary with the installer's privileges.

This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.1.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

05323f987b64131618be124040867a2acb216aef96952a6a3dfc11c615501500

41b2d5a1d7c854367ea1055af8d4ea71a425bdff2a55888f86caaf7d53e5df16

146faaf0d97c6a533a969bc3f3f117811f9317dc865ed4ab37f1679842ddeaae

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for wdb-sdk (version 0.1.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging wdb-sdk across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
wdb-sdk is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If wdb-sdk was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks wdb-sdk before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. wdb-sdk on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.1.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004818IN-MAL-2026-004837

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks wdb-sdk-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring