Which versions of wdb-cli are malicious?

The following npm versions of wdb-cli are flagged malicious: 0.1.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate wdb-cli if I installed it?

wdb-cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed wdb-cli — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If wdb-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is wdb-cli part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — wdb-cli is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004816 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find wdb-cli across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for wdb-cli (version 0.1.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging wdb-cli across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

wdb-clinpm

Malicious code in wdb-cli (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4713

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall wdb-cli

What this malware does

package.json declares "preinstall": "./vendor/setup", which on every npm install invokes a 976568-byte Linux x86 ELF binary shipped inside the package tarball (sha256 36abd242…6d36). The binary has no accompanying source, no binding.gyp, no build step, and is not documented anywhere in the package. Strings inside the ELF reveal capabilities (LIBBPF_0.0, PTRACE, NETLINK, HTTP/1.1, https://, RSA crypto) that have no plausible relationship to a database CLI's installation. The installer cannot inspect the bytes before they execute, the binary is not hash-verified, and it is not pulled from a publisher-matching, version-pinned release. Any developer or CI environment running npm install wdb-cli therefore executes opaque, attacker-controllable native code with the invoking user's privileges, with eBPF/ptrace primitives that enable kernel-level observation and process tampering, and with built-in HTTPS capability for outbound exfiltration or C2. A separate file (workspace/.wallet.json) ships a full RSA private key, but that appears to be author self-harm (the author's own dev wallet copied into user-created project scaffolds via an explicit CLI subcommand) and is not the basis for this verdict.

This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.1.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

3ddd306d024c4dd394d19c1adb610389f239fa619d25fff4f75b857a678da0ee

146faaf0d97c6a533a969bc3f3f117811f9317dc865ed4ab37f1679842ddeaae

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for wdb-cli (version 0.1.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging wdb-cli across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
wdb-cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If wdb-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks wdb-cli before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. wdb-cli on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.1.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004816

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks wdb-cli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring