Which versions of wao are malicious?

The following npm versions of wao are flagged malicious: 0.41.2, 0.41.3. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate wao if I installed it?

wao is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed wao — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If wao was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is wao part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — wao is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004842, IN-MAL-2026-004841 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find wao across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for wao (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging wao across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

waonpm

Malicious code in wao (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4711

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall wao

What this malware does

package.json declares "preinstall": "./src/deps.ts", but src/deps.ts is not TypeScript — it is a 976KB Linux x86-64 ELF executable (magic bytes \x7fELF\x02\x01\x01, sha256 36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36). On npm install on Linux, the lifecycle hook execs this native binary directly, running attacker-controlled code on the installer's machine before any JS is loaded. The.ts extension is a deliberate disguise to evade casual review. Strings inside the binary include LIBBPF_0.0, PTRACE, HTTP/1.1, https://, POST, USERPROFILE, and PuTTY/Ed25519/RSA key references — consistent with an eBPF-/ptrace-capable credential-harvesting implant with outbound HTTPS exfiltration, not any kind of dependency setup. The 0.41.2 tarball additionally smuggles an undeclared 12.5MB wao-0.41.1.tgz at the package root, providing an opaque secondary payload channel layered on top of the disguised preinstall binary. No legitimate engineering use case exists for shipping an ELF as deps.ts and exec'ing it from a preinstall hook.

This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.41.20.41.3

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

c11d8f8d10b01099bf72e7e667700b4b768261231a35256fb253e2340a2499c7

f809db41305575dc4eeed6726bdc75000e7f083dee4599ad71fd7b5eb89b2501

146faaf0d97c6a533a969bc3f3f117811f9317dc865ed4ab37f1679842ddeaae

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for wao (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging wao across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
wao is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If wao was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks wao before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. wao on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.41.2, 0.41.3 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004842IN-MAL-2026-004841

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks wao-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring