wagmi_utilnpm
Malicious code in wagmi_util (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package wagmi_util impersonates the popular wagmi package: it copies wagmi's tagline ("React Hooks for Ethereum"), re-exports wagmi's full React-hooks public API (WagmiProvider, useConnect, useWalletClient, useSignMessage, useSendTransaction, useWriteContract, etc.), and links to wagmi.sh in JSDoc — while being published by an unrelated author with no legitimate wagmi_util package existing under the wevm namespace. The package.json declares a runtime dependency on [email protected], but no source file in the package imports sync-external; every internal use of useSyncExternalStoreWithSelector imports the legitimate use-sync-external-store/shim/with-selector.js instead. Installing wagmi_util therefore silently pulls [email protected] into the installer's dependency tree even though the wrapper's own code never loads it. The wrapper itself is clean re-exports of wagmi; the attack surface is the unused-but-pinned transitive, which a developer choosing a wagmi-adjacent utility would not expect to receive.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for wagmi_util (version 3.6.19). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging wagmi_util across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
wagmi_util is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If wagmi_util was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks wagmi_util before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks wagmi_util-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.