w-screenctlnpm
w-screenctl is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13618) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.4, 1.0.6, 1.0.7). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in w-screenctl (npm)
What this malware does
When WScreenctl() is invoked (via the bundled g.mjs entry or the documented systemd/Task Scheduler service units), the package starts a Hapi HTTP server bound to 0.0.0.0:7000 with CORS enabled and no authentication. POST /chrome/evaluate passes the request body's script field directly to Playwright's page.evaluate, allowing arbitrary JavaScript execution inside the controlled Chrome instance. POST /keyboard/type, /keyboard/key, and /mouse/* forward HTTP-supplied text, key names, and coordinates into xdotool or w-mousekey/AHK, driving system-wide keyboard and mouse input on the host desktop. Because the listener binds to all interfaces with no credential check, any party reachable on the network — LAN, adjacent VLAN, or an internet-routable interface — can execute JavaScript in the browser session and drive arbitrary keystrokes and clicks on the operator's machine, which can be used to open a terminal, type shell commands, and achieve full host RCE. The dist bundle also contains child_process usage tied to ping and POST primitives consistent with this HTTP dispatch surface.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for w-screenctl (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging w-screenctl across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
w-screenctl is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If w-screenctl was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks w-screenctl before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks w-screenctl-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.