vue-template-compiler-pluginnpm
Malicious code in vue-template-compiler-plugin (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Full C2 implant disguised as vue-template-compiler fork. postinstall-run.cjs loads tooling-bootstrap.cjs which contains base64-encoded C2 agent. Decoded payload: registers victim (hostname, username, OS) to Cloudflare tunnel C2 at maiden-apply-looks-education.trycloudflare.com, beacons for tasks, reports results, uploads files. Persists agent ID in ~/.gradle-cache/.aid. Has C2_TLS_INSECURE env var bypass. Package mirrors vue-template-compiler version 2.7.16 and claims to be an 'API-compatible fork with postinstall hooks' — social engineering for npm override/alias substitution.
This package impersonates the legitimate vue-template-compiler (same version 2.7.18, framed as an "API-compatible fork"), and its package.json description instructs consumers to alias the real name to this one via npm overrides or resolve.alias. On install, the postinstall hook (postinstall-run.cjs) loads tooling-bootstrap.cjs, which assembles ~80 base64 string fragments in BOOTSTRAP_B64, Buffer.from-decodes them, writes the result to ~/.gradle/daemon/tooling-api-runtime.mjs (a cover-story path mimicking a Gradle cache), and then spawns node on that file with detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true, and child.unref() so the process survives npm install. The decoded payload is a remote-access trojan that polls https://maiden-apply-looks-education.trycloudflare.com/ for commands, executes arbitrary shell commands on the installer's host, and exfiltrates files. Three independent block signals: (1) typosquat-with-divergent-API against a top-tier Vue package, (2) obfuscated base64-chunked executable payload decoded and exec'd at install, (3) persistent detached RAT beaconing to an attacker-controlled Cloudflare quick-tunnel.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for vue-template-compiler-plugin (version 2.7.18). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging vue-template-compiler-plugin across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
vue-template-compiler-plugin is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If vue-template-compiler-plugin was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks vue-template-compiler-plugin before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks vue-template-compiler-plugin-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.