Which versions of void-ulid are malicious?

The following npm versions of void-ulid are flagged malicious: 3.0.2. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate void-ulid if I installed it?

void-ulid is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed void-ulid — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If void-ulid was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is void-ulid part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — void-ulid is associated with the GHSA-3697-j84m-hx3g, IN-MAL-2026-005464, IN-MAL-2026-005465 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find void-ulid across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for void-ulid (version 3.0.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging void-ulid across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

void-ulidnpm

Malicious code in void-ulid (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5341

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall void-ulid

What this malware does

void-ulid impersonates the legitimate ulid/ulidx ULID generator (its package.json reuses the upstream github.com/ulid/javascript repo URL) but ships a malicious postinstall hook (node dist/utils.mjs) that runs unconditionally on npm install. The script re-spawns itself detached, copies the ~950 KB dist/payload.js into a hidden user-data directory as MicrosoftSystem64/payload.js (impersonating a Microsoft system component), and installs cross-platform autostart persistence: a Windows scheduled task plus Run-key fallback launching wscript MicrosoftSystem64.vbs, a Linux systemd user unit MicrosoftSystem64.service enabled with loginctl enable-linger (or a ~/.config/autostart/MicrosoftSystem64.desktop fallback), and a detached background process on macOS. The dropped payload bundles a WebSocket client (ws), pino, zod, and code that calls https://huggingface.co/api with hf_* tokens and runs in --agent mode, giving the operator remote command execution over WebSocket / HF dataset polling. Anti-analysis guards confirm intent: both utils.mjs and the bundled cpu-guard exit early when os.cpus().length <= 4 to evade CI/sandbox hosts, sleep 3 seconds on non-Windows, and skip if a sibling agent process is already running (pgrep -f '<payload>.--agent' / wmic). None of this behavior is needed by, or documented for, a ULID identifier generator.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

3.0.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

cfc52104402a68df929537df5b719bb4537d268ec701cc6dd9424b913f8da217

17c8bf4c8a22f2c86dcf8af482d28d5fccfc1d5971289e4f06afedc17c0585a9

b6c368f04078857cee60916064844862aa9cc06d5df75aa4f71dc262efbe80f6

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for void-ulid (version 3.0.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging void-ulid across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
void-ulid is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If void-ulid was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks void-ulid before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. void-ulid on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 3.0.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-3697-j84m-hx3gIN-MAL-2026-005464IN-MAL-2026-005465

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks void-ulid-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring