viteplugiinnpm
Malicious code in viteplugiin (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The npm package 'viteplugiin' impersonates '@base44/viteplugin' via a one-character insertion (doubled 'i') and ships a hostile payload in dist/index.js, the entry resolved by the package's exports map. After the legitimate-looking plugin code, a large whitespace gap conceals an obfuscated stub that uses Fisher-Yates string shuffles with hardcoded seeds to reconstruct the identifiers 'require', '__dirname', '__filename', 'undefined', and 'constructor', reassigns require/__dirname/__filename onto the global object, obtains the Function constructor, and invokes it on two decoded string bodies — executing attacker-controlled JavaScript at module load time in the consumer's Vite build. Because Vite configs import plugins at config-evaluation time, adding this plugin to vite.config.* causes the payload to run on developer and CI machines during any Vite command. Provenance is consistent with an attack drop: empty author field, no repository/homepage, and package.json 'main' pointing at a nonexistent root index.js while the exports map silently routes '.' to the tampered dist/index.js. The README and internal resolveId targets reference the legitimate '@base44/vite-plugin' as cover.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for viteplugiin (version 1.0.28). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging viteplugiin across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
viteplugiin is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove viteplugiin, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If viteplugiin was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks viteplugiin before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks viteplugiin-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.