vite-json-confignpm
Malicious code in vite-json-config (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package presents itself as a vite/tsconfig path helper and clones the public API of tsconfig-paths (createMatchPath, matchFromAbsolutePaths, register, loadConfig). A new exported configJson entry point spawns a detached node lib/mapProps.js child process via child_process.spawn(..., { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }) (lib/config-loader.js). lib/mapProps.js performs an HTTPS GET to https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/5IZTJ — an anonymous, mutable JSON paste host — and passes the response's Cookie field directly to new Function('require', s)(require), giving the publisher arbitrary code execution inside the consumer process with full require access. The fetch URL and header are concealed by shadowing process with a local object whose env uses cover-story names (DEV_API_KEY, DEV_SECRET_KEY, DEV_SECRET_VALUE) that actually hold the C2 URL and HTTP header. There is no integrity check on the fetched payload; the paste content can be changed at any time by whoever controls the jsonkeeper.com entry. Combined with the cloned legitimate-package API surface, this is a deliberate supply-chain dropper, not a coding mistake.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for vite-json-config (version 1.0.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging vite-json-config across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
vite-json-config establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If vite-json-config was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks vite-json-config before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks vite-json-config-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.