visa-cli-toolsnpm
Malicious code in visa-cli-tools (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package presents as an internal-looking corporate tooling name ('visa-cli-tools') published at an inflated version (99.9.1) — the canonical dependency-confusion shape used to override a private-registry resolution with a public-npm entry. The package body is a hollow stub (index.js exports an empty object), so the package has no library utility; its only on-install effect is dependency resolution. package.json declares a single dependency 'ltidisafe' via a direct URL to a third-party Google Cloud Storage bucket (https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.1.2.tgz) rather than a registry name+semver. The URL path segment 'depenconf' explicitly labels the dependency-confusion technique. On npm install, the tarball is fetched from the bucket (outside registry review, mutable by the bucket owner at any time) and its contents enter the installer's dependency tree with normal install-time execution rights, including any lifecycle hooks in that tarball. The hollow lure + inflated version + name mimicking an internal namespace + external mutable tarball delivery jointly constitute a dependency-confusion dropper.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for visa-cli-tools (version 99.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging visa-cli-tools across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
visa-cli-tools is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove visa-cli-tools, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If visa-cli-tools was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks visa-cli-tools before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks visa-cli-tools-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.