via-city-tools-m-particlenpm
Malicious code in via-city-tools-m-particle (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package exports an empty object (module.exports = {}) and has no functionality of its own. Its only substantive effect is to declare a dependency on ltidisafe pinned to the off-registry tarball URL https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-2.7.6.tgz. Installing this package causes npm to fetch and install that arbitrary tarball — hosted in a generic Google Cloud Storage bucket with no registry integrity guarantees and no publisher binding — and any lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/postinstall) inside it run automatically on the installer's machine. The package metadata is hollow (empty description, empty author, no repository), and the unscoped name via-city-tools-m-particle resembles legitimate scoped tooling, consistent with a dependency-confusion lure whose only purpose is to smuggle the off-registry tarball into target build environments.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for via-city-tools-m-particle (version 99.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging via-city-tools-m-particle across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove via-city-tools-m-particle from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If via-city-tools-m-particle was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks via-city-tools-m-particle before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- ReversingLabs · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks via-city-tools-m-particle-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.