veteran-proxynpm
Malicious code in veteran-proxy (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the postinstall hook (node install.js) downloads a platform-specific binary archive from a hardcoded https://your-website.com/downloads/veteran/... URL, extracts it, chmods it 0755, and immediately executes it (execSync("${BIN_PATH}" version)). The README advertises that binaries come from GitHub Releases at github.com/yongjie0203/veteran/releases, but the install script hardcodes your-website.com with a Chinese-language comment instructing the maintainer to replace it with their real download host — the package was published to npm with the placeholder in place. There is no hash or signature verification of the fetched bytes. Whoever registers or already controls your-website.com can ship arbitrary executables to every installer of this package, with full code execution on the installer's machine. Even absent registered malicious intent today, the install path is undefined: the destination domain is not under the publisher's control, the URL is unpinned, and the fetched binary's purpose (advertised as a SOCKS5 proxy) cannot be verified.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for veteran-proxy (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging veteran-proxy across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove veteran-proxy from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If veteran-proxy was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks veteran-proxy before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks veteran-proxy-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.