What does the verify-mycommand malware do?

On `npm install`, postinstall.js executes `whoami` and `id`, collects host identity (hostname, platform, cwd) and CI metadata (CI, GITHUB_REPOSITORY, NODE_ENV environment variables), and beacons the data via HTTPS GET to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain `md3zp4gf8gwxh437mjijacjbe2ky8pwe.oastify.com`. A DNS lookup of ` . ` is also performed for out-of-band exfiltration. The package's own metadata describes it as a 'Security research canary' with a 'Takeover By lobo' marker, consistent with a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept or namespace hijack — but the install-time behavior is real exfiltration of installer identity and CI context to an attacker-controlled OAST endpoi

Which versions of verify-mycommand are malicious?

The following npm versions of verify-mycommand are flagged malicious: 2.0.4. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate verify-mycommand if I installed it?

verify-mycommand is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed verify-mycommand — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If verify-mycommand was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is verify-mycommand part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — verify-mycommand is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004734, IN-MAL-2026-004735, GHSA-cg2p-m899-xgpg campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find verify-mycommand across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for verify-mycommand (version 2.0.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging verify-mycommand across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

verify-mycommandnpm

Malicious code in verify-mycommand (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4344

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall verify-mycommand

What this malware does

On npm install, postinstall.js executes whoami and id, collects host identity (hostname, platform, cwd) and CI metadata (CI, GITHUB_REPOSITORY, NODE_ENV environment variables), and beacons the data via HTTPS GET to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain md3zp4gf8gwxh437mjijacjbe2ky8pwe.oastify.com. A DNS lookup of <whoami>.<host> is also performed for out-of-band exfiltration. The package's own metadata describes it as a 'Security research canary' with a 'Takeover By lobo' marker, consistent with a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept or namespace hijack — but the install-time behavior is real exfiltration of installer identity and CI context to an attacker-controlled OAST endpoint regardless of stated intent. Any machine running npm install for this package leaks host and CI identifiers to a third party.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'verify-mycommand' @ 2.0.4 (npm) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

2.0.4

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

0314ac9dcfab8957567efe770124ce8f1fd490d7d461d0853630bbe5806a43e0

2f94ffb54a2471d0cc94ce1ea88f741e034221a374f17bfadbd609cb22f14f24

e81e3137d93a6987561f6173d077a801d430bdffeb80ece22c91fee0801cde69

f26fdadf3b7e97f88e15aa331f3af159ef2a7d3e29e5df68fe2aba59cf4b8e20

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for verify-mycommand (version 2.0.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging verify-mycommand across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
verify-mycommand is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If verify-mycommand was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks verify-mycommand before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. verify-mycommand on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 2.0.4 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004734IN-MAL-2026-004735GHSA-cg2p-m899-xgpg

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks verify-mycommand-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring