vectormarknpm

[email protected] advertises itself as a zero-dependency SVG helper library, but index.js exports an undocumented function getPlugin() that issues an HTTPS GET to the hardcoded lookalike domain api.avax-test.dev (the legitimate Avalanche Fuji testnet host is api.avax-test.network) with TLS certificate verification disabled (rejectUnauthorized: false), then passes the raw response body into new Function('require', data)(require). Any caller that invokes getPlugin() — or any tool that auto-enumerates the package's exports — executes attacker-controlled JavaScript with full require access on the host. The endpoint variable is named AVALANCHE_FUJI_RPC_URL and the sink is named getPlugin to blend with legitimate blockchain tooling; the README does not mention this function, and package.json omits the 'request' dependency the file otherwise references. The lookalike domain, disabled TLS verification, cover-story naming, and mismatch between the advertised SVG-helper purpose and the actual code path establish intent.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.