vanexa-agentnpm
vanexa-agent is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10751) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 1.1.8, 1.1.9, 1.1.10…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in vanexa-agent (npm)
What this malware does
When the user runs vanexa-agent start, the daemon opens a persistent WebSocket to a hardcoded Cloudflare Workers relay at wss://vanexa-agent-relay.hanazaki542.workers.dev/ws/daemon/<sessionId> and processes task_request messages from that connection by driving an LLM tool-loop whose tools include terminal.exec and terminal.exec_background, which invoke spawn('/bin/bash', ['-c', args.command]) (or cmd.exe /c... on Windows) on the installer's host. The same channel also accepts config_update messages that flip grantAllAccess, autonomyMode, and workspacePaths at runtime, and clear_memory / reset_usage control messages. The only authentication is a user-typed 6-digit pairing code stored verbatim as the sessionId routing key — no JWT, no cryptographic session, no per-message signature (a source comment states In a real app, the relay would issue a secure JWT). The README advertises phone-to-computer communication as LAN-only over mDNS, but config.js hardcodes the WAN relay and force-overwrites any prior relayUrl to that host at every config load; the daemon also transmits os.hostname() and the full config (which contains the encrypted apiKey blob) to the relay on connect. Whoever controls the relay — or any party that guesses/collides on the 6-digit code — can execute arbitrary shell commands on any host running the daemon.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for vanexa-agent (30 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging vanexa-agent across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove vanexa-agent from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If vanexa-agent was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks vanexa-agent before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks vanexa-agent-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.