url-func-registrynpm
Malicious code in url-func-registry (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] exposes a factory createJsonService (registered under key 'JsonS' in the public getFunc API) that fetches https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/XVHGD — an anonymous, publicly-editable, author-mutable JSON hosting service — reads the data property from the response, and passes it to new Function.constructor('require', data.data) which is then invoked with the real require bound. This compiles and executes arbitrary JavaScript hosted at an author-controlled slug on a third-party paste service, giving whoever controls that slug full code execution in any consumer process that reaches the 'JsonS' factory. The package presents itself as a URL/singleton registry; remote code execution is not part of the documented behavior, and the createJsonService / 'JsonS' naming frames the sink as a benign JSON fetch. Because the payload is served from a mutable pastebin, the executed content can be swapped at any time without any package republish. The backdoor fires only when a consumer invokes the factory (not at install/import), but any downstream integration that iterates or looks up the registered factories will trigger it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for url-func-registry (version 1.0.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging url-func-registry across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
url-func-registry establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If url-func-registry was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks url-func-registry before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks url-func-registry-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.