Which versions of unique-id-64 are malicious?

The following npm versions of unique-id-64 are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate unique-id-64 if I installed it?

unique-id-64 is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove unique-id-64, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.

I already installed unique-id-64 — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If unique-id-64 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is unique-id-64 part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — unique-id-64 is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004849 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find unique-id-64 across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for unique-id-64 (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging unique-id-64 across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

unique-id-64npm

Malicious code in unique-id-64 (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4781

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall unique-id-64

What this malware does

Package impersonates the well-known sindresorhus/unique-string utility: package.json copies the author block (name 'Sindre Sorhus', email [email protected], homepage sindresorhus.com), repository field 'sindresorhus/unique-string', and README verbatim, despite not being published by that author. The default export, when invoked as uniqueString(64), AES-256-CBC-decrypts a hardcoded ciphertext (key derived from sha256('256-key')) and hands the plaintext to globalThis.eval, with 'eval' reconstructed obfuscation-style by joining the first letters of ['error','vertex','alphabetic','length']. Before reaching the eval branch, the code consults node-env-detector and short-circuits to a warning log when env.isCI || env.isNpmBot || env.isContainer || env.isVirtualMachineLikely is true — a deliberate sandbox/CI evasion gate so the hidden payload only fires on real developer or production hosts. The combination of identity-spoofed metadata, encrypted eval'd payload, and analysis-evasion gating is an unambiguous supply-chain attack: the installer cannot see what code runs, and the package's stated purpose (generate a unique string) does not require eval, AES decryption, or CI detection.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

8ab3b19e4bd1602de93ca092a5909f8b69927c01d5a690d3484116024dfc46e2

Detection & response playbook

Typosquat

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for unique-id-64 (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging unique-id-64 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
unique-id-64 is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove unique-id-64, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If unique-id-64 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks unique-id-64 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. unique-id-64 on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004849

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks unique-id-64-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring