unifydatanpm
Malicious code in unifydata (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On require('unifydata'), index.js calls initPlugin() at module top level, performs an HTTPS GET to https://jsonkeeper.com/b/B40HL, JSON-parses the response, and executes the response's cookie field as JavaScript via new Function.constructor('require', body.cookie) — then immediately invokes the resulting function with the real require, granting it full Node module-loading capability. jsonkeeper.com is an anonymous, author-mutable JSON paste service; the bytes executed in any installer process are whatever the author has posted there at the time of import, with no pinning, hashing, or signature. The package presents itself with a header comment labeling it normalize-plus (ES6 safe version) and ships a benign-looking normalizePath helper as a decoy, while the published package name is unifydata — the mislabeled cover and unused utility code are consistent with a dropper masquerading as a routine helper. Any process that imports this package executes arbitrary attacker-controlled code with the privileges of that process.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for unifydata (version 3.6.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging unifydata across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove unifydata from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If unifydata was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks unifydata before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks unifydata-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.