unifi-portalnpm
Malicious code in unifi-portal (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package is a self-described dependency-confusion proof-of-concept published unscoped on the public npm registry under a name presumed to match a private internal package. package.json declares preinstall: node index.js || true, and index.js performs a DNS resolution and HTTPS GET to a unique subdomain of oast.me (an Interactsh out-of-band collector controlled by a third party) at install time. Any installer whose tooling resolves this name — including unrelated developers and CI systems — leaks public IP, DNS resolver identity, hostname-derived callback id, and install timing to the OAST endpoint without consent. The unscoped public name targeting an internal package namespace is the namespace-confusion lure, and the preinstall beacon is the exfiltration payload. Stated 'authorized research' framing does not limit the blast radius: any third party who resolves this name is impacted.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'unifi-portal' @ 99.0.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for unifi-portal (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging unifi-portal across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
unifi-portal is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If unifi-portal was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks unifi-portal before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks unifi-portal-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.