unico-androidnpm
unico-android is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-5829) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 9.9.9). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in unico-android (npm)
What this malware does
On npm install, the package.json preinstall hook runs curl against https://webhook.site/fe1246c2-ac04-4493-b223-fe34ba26b79f with query parameters carrying the installer's hostname, username ($(whoami)), current working directory ($(pwd)), kernel/OS string ($(uname -a)), and $HOME. The destination is a third-party request-capture service used as ad-hoc C2; the installer has not consented to this outbound transmission. The package otherwise ships no functional code despite advertising itself as the "Unico Android SDK - biometric identity verification" library, and is published at version 9.9.9 — a sentinel commonly used to outrank legitimate internal versions in dependency-confusion attacks against an organization's private registry. The combination of a hollow manifest impersonating an internal SDK name, a sentinel version, and an automatic install-time recon beacon is the canonical dependency-confusion / namespace-abuse attack shape.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'unico-android' @ 9.9.9 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for unico-android (version 9.9.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging unico-android across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
unico-android establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If unico-android was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks unico-android before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks unico-android-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.