uisp-connectornpm
Malicious code in uisp-connector (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares preinstall: node index.js || true, causing index.js to run automatically on npm install. index.js issues a DNS resolution and HTTPS GET to a unique subdomain under oast.online (an Interactsh out-of-band collection server). The callback reveals the installer's resolver IP, egress IP, and the fact that an internal build system fetched a package matching this name — the canonical dependency-confusion exfiltration signal. The README self-identifies the package as security research, and the version string contains security-research, but an installer cannot distinguish authorized research from real exploitation: the network beacon and information disclosure happen identically in both cases, and whoever controls the Interactsh subdomain receives the data.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'uisp-connector' @ 99.0.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for uisp-connector (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging uisp-connector across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
uisp-connector is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If uisp-connector was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks uisp-connector before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks uisp-connector-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.