ui-weavenpm
Malicious code in ui-weave (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares postinstall: node lib/utils/index.js, which spawns a detached child process running lib/utils/smtp-connection/index.js. That script fetches https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/QHDXR and feeds the response's data.cookie field directly into new Function('require', data.cookie)(require), executing whatever JavaScript is hosted at that URL on every machine that runs npm install ui-weave. jsonkeeper.com is a public, mutable, anonymous paste host — the author can change the served payload at any time without republishing the package. The detached/unref'd spawn is intended to outlive the install command. The package additionally impersonates nodemailer: it ships nodemailer's source under lib/nodemailer.js, claims author Andris Reinman (the real nodemailer maintainer), and copies an unrelated React Training copyright string as its description, while being published under the unrelated name ui-weave with homepage ui-weave.com. The impersonation provides a veneer of legitimacy for the install-time remote-code-execution payload.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ui-weave (version 1.0.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ui-weave across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ui-weave is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove ui-weave, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If ui-weave was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ui-weave before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ui-weave-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.