Which versions of uhd-setup are malicious?

The following npm versions of uhd-setup are flagged malicious: 0.0.1-security-research, 99.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate uhd-setup if I installed it?

uhd-setup establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed uhd-setup — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If uhd-setup was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is uhd-setup part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — uhd-setup is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-005244, IN-MAL-2026-005243 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find uhd-setup across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for uhd-setup (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging uhd-setup across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

uhd-setupnpm

Malicious code in uhd-setup (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5287

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall uhd-setup

What this malware does

package.json declares scripts.preinstall: node index.js. On npm install, index.js (lines 4-5) performs dns.resolve and https.get against <id>.d8hiivedv3ok8hrng5eghchyw4hwsioaz.oast.online, an Interactsh OAST collector. The request fires unconditionally with no opt-out, leaking the installer's egress IP, internal DNS resolver identity, and fact-of-install (with the package id encoded in the subdomain and URL path) to a third-party-controlled endpoint. The README frames this as authorized dependency-confusion research targeting Ubiquiti, but the beacon does not gate on any organizational identifier — any installer that pulls this name (typo, internal-name collision, automated mirror) sends build-system metadata to the researcher. Trigger is the preinstall lifecycle hook, so the network call fires before any code review opportunity.

The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'uhd-setup' @ 99.0.0 (npm) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.0.1-security-research99.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

358eee34aaba61eaa93e977d35a18f35f59a56527d7c20b6e9a0bdf9c4a0a8da

7cf641e43172371f2f9c843ad0b68bad139485231e30e9ef8072197977d9f2d5

8cd16b0b6896b16874da441b7197b846bf0c725dcff0ef2d6e8f93c6cc08fc99

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for uhd-setup (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging uhd-setup across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
uhd-setup establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If uhd-setup was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks uhd-setup before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. uhd-setup on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.0.1-security-research, 99.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-005244IN-MAL-2026-005243

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks uhd-setup-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring