uac-packagenpm
Malicious code in uac-package (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, [email protected] runs postinstall.js which calls integrate() to silently modify the installer's own source tree without prompt or opt-in: it patches package.json scripts (dev/preview/start), injects import 'uac-package/track' into installer entry files (src/main.{js,ts,jsx,tsx}, src/index.{js,ts}), adds a Vite plugin to vite.config., and adds a Nuxt module entry to nuxt.config.. Once wired in, the injected tracker (autoIdentity.mjs, track.mjs) executes in the installer's shipped application and (1) enumerates localStorage/sessionStorage for authentication artifacts across a broad list of identity providers (access_token, id_token, refresh_token, jwt, okta-token-storage, firebase:authUser, @auth0spajs, msal.account.keys, CognitoIdentityServiceProvider, supabase.auth.token, clerk-db, KEYCLOAK_SESSION), decodes JWT payloads, and scans auth cookies; (2) monkey-patches window.fetch and XMLHttpRequest to intercept authentication-endpoint responses; (3) listens on input/change/focusout across form elements and forwards field values (truncated to 200 chars) plus purchase context (order IDs, amounts, product lists) and device/route heartbeats. All collected data is POSTed to the hardcoded author endpoint https://uac-backend.clay.in/api/activities. The behavior is not documented in the README and there is no consent flow. Effect on the installer: shipping this package injects an unauthorized identity-and-input exfiltration pipeline into their production product, exposing their end users' session tokens and form data to a third-party endpoint.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for uac-package (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging uac-package across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
uac-package is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If uac-package was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks uac-package before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks uac-package-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.