typesript-corenpm
typesript-core is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14155) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in typesript-core (npm)
What this malware does
[email protected] is a typosquat of 'typescript' whose index.js is an empty object; the package has no library functionality. Its only behavior is scripts/postinstall.js, which runs automatically on npm install. The script XOR-decodes (key 'stf2026') a hardcoded payload URL, array-joins the C2 host 193.70.34.101 to hide the literal IP, POSTs a host-fingerprint JSON body ({platform: label}) to http://193.70.34.101:20099/vote, then downloads a Windows PE to %TEMP%\main.exe and spawns it detached with stdio ignored and windowsHide set. When run under WSL, a separately XOR-decoded PowerShell 'bridge' command is exec'd to fetch and launch the same binary on the Windows host. Payload URL, PowerShell bridge invocation, and pre/post script fragments are all shipped as XOR-encoded byte arrays and decoded at runtime.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for typesript-core (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging typesript-core across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
typesript-core establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If typesript-core was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks typesript-core before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks typesript-core-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.