typescirpt-corenpm
typescirpt-core is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14149) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in typescirpt-core (npm)
What this malware does
Package name 'typescirpt-core' typosquats 'typescript'. scripts/postinstall.js runs automatically on npm install and posts a JSON platform beacon to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at http://193.70.34.101:20099/vote (host constructed by array-join to evade static matching). It then XOR-decodes (key 'stf2026') an embedded integer array into a remote URL and downloads a Windows executable to %TEMP%/main.exe, spawning it detached with stdio ignored and window hidden. A separate WSL-detection branch XOR-decodes a PowerShell bridge launcher and pre/post script fragments and passes the reconstructed command to child_process.exec, so a Linux WSL install pivots execution back to the host Windows side. The URL, launcher command, and script fragments are all stored as XOR-encoded byte arrays and reconstructed at runtime immediately before exec/https.get, hiding the download destination and command line from static inspection.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for typescirpt-core (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging typescirpt-core across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
typescirpt-core establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If typescirpt-core was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks typescirpt-core before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks typescirpt-core-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.