typeorm-encryptnpm
typeorm-encrypt is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-5633) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 1.0.1, 1.0.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in typeorm-encrypt (npm)
What this malware does
The published tarball contains lib/lib.min.js, a heavily obfuscated file that stashes Node intrinsics on globals (global['r']=require; global['m']=module;) before invoking a Function-constructor eval'd payload. This is the canonical dropper shape: code that needs require access but is structured to evade casual review through a permutation-decoder + Function-eval pipeline. The file is not referenced from lib/index.js (the package main) or any other clean module in the package, whose stated purpose is a small TypeORM transformer for encrypted columns (lib/crypto.js, lib/entity.js, lib/transformer.js show that purpose in clear source). Shipping an obfuscated payload that has no role in the advertised functionality, and that is wired to access Node's require/module via globals when invoked, is unjustified for a column-encryption transformer. Corroborating signal: package.json declares an empty author name with a lookalike email domain ([email protected]) and no repository or homepage fields — typical placeholder maintainer metadata. While the obfuscated file is dormant on a default require('typeorm-encrypt') (it is not on the load graph from main), its presence in the tarball means any path that loads it — a future patch flipping main, a sibling package requiring typeorm-encrypt/lib/lib.min.js directly, or runtime code in other distribution paths — executes attacker-controlled obfuscated code with full Node intrinsics access. The combination of obfuscation, require-stashing prologue, purpose mismatch, and placeholder maintainer identity is consistent with smuggled malicious code.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for typeorm-encrypt (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging typeorm-encrypt across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
typeorm-encrypt is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove typeorm-encrypt, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If typeorm-encrypt was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks typeorm-encrypt before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks typeorm-encrypt-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.