Which versions of type-unique are malicious?

The following npm versions of type-unique are flagged malicious: 3.1.3. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate type-unique if I installed it?

type-unique establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed type-unique — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If type-unique was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is type-unique part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — type-unique is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010352, GHSA-h8x5-f48q-v2h7 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find type-unique across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for type-unique (version 3.1.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging type-unique across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

type-uniquenpm

Malicious code in type-unique (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10512

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall type-unique

What this malware does

[email protected] presents itself as the pino logger (matching README, keywords, and package shape) but on require() its index.js spawns a detached node lib/caller.js child process. That child fetches JSON from https://jsonhosting.com/api/json/3ea04c38/raw, extracts a cookie field, and executes its content via new Function.constructor('require', s)(require), giving remote content full Node.js capabilities including the bound require. Additional C2 URLs (https://jsonkeeper.com/b/XRGF3, https://jsonkeeper.com/b/4NAKK) are stored base64-encoded as fake DEV_API_KEY constants in lib/caller.js and lib/const.js to hide the destinations. The fetched payload is unpinned, unauthenticated, and served from third-party JSON-hosting services controlled by the author, so arbitrary code can be delivered to any machine that loads the package.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

3.1.3

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

b576b19c56055dbc3638b361d0071c669108b9a6f8756828cadee4214d57bb13

a3ede5b2d04e8a69403b546398ae82a613127d9985e32b1b1299d67e522c8217

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for type-unique (version 3.1.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging type-unique across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
type-unique establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If type-unique was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks type-unique before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. type-unique on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 3.1.3 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010352GHSA-h8x5-f48q-v2h7

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks type-unique-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring