type-elintnpm
Malicious code in type-elint (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package impersonates the pino logger (README is pino documentation, package name is a lookalike). The main export is a middleware factory that spawns lib/caller.js as a detached Node child process. caller.js retrieves JavaScript from hardcoded remote endpoints at https://json.extendsclass.com/bin/863e90480800 and https://jsonkeeper.com/b/XRGF3, then evaluates the response body using the Function constructor with require passed in scope, yielding arbitrary code execution in the consumer's environment under the endpoint owner's control. The destination URLs are base64-encoded and stored under a decoy DEV_API_KEY property (e.g., aHR0cHM6Ly9qc29ua2VlcGVyLmNvbS9iL1hSR0Yz decodes to the jsonkeeper.com URL) to hide the C2/dead-drop from casual review. Mutable third-party paste services as the code source mean the delivered payload can change at any time without any package update.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for type-elint (version 3.3.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging type-elint across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
type-elint establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If type-elint was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks type-elint before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks type-elint-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.