twork-data-services-product-design-datanpm
twork-data-services-product-design-data is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12296) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 20.1.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in twork-data-services-product-design-data (npm)
What this malware does
On require of the package's main module, loader.js downloads a platform-specific binary from a set of obfuscated Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev) — reconstructed at runtime from split string arrays — with a DNS TXT chunked-base64 fallback over *.dl.well1.site (tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site). The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under cover names such as.cache<hex> and dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmodded 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. A parallel dropper implementation is bundled at lib/telemetry.js dressed as an APM/telemetry SDK, using base64 chunk assembly (Buffer.from(chunks,'base64')), string-concatenated fs['chmod'+'Sync'] to set 0755, and cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', filePath+' &']). The string-split concealment of C2 hostnames, DNS exfil domains, and the child_process module name is deliberate static-analysis evasion.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for twork-data-services-product-design-data (version 20.1.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging twork-data-services-product-design-data across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
twork-data-services-product-design-data establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If twork-data-services-product-design-data was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks twork-data-services-product-design-data before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks twork-data-services-product-design-data-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.