twokeynpm
Malicious code in twokey (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's postinstall hook unconditionally executes node bin/twokey.js --desktop --enable-autostart, which performs three install-time actions without prompting the installer: (1) fetches https://api.github.com/repos/meinzeug/twokey/releases/latest, downloads the resulting AppImage to ~/.local/share/twokey/bin/twokey-ai.AppImage, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached with stdio ignored — the URL is the mutable 'latest' endpoint, not pinned to the npm package version, and no hash or signature verification is performed; (2) writes ~/.config/systemd/user/twokey.service and runs systemctl --user daemon-reload && systemctl --user enable twokey.service so the auto-downloaded AppImage runs on every boot; (3) when invoked via sudo, re-spawns itself as the original user via sudo -u $SUDO_USER -H node bin/twokey.js --desktop --enable-autostart with XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS injected, extending the install footprint into the desktop user's session. The destination repo matches the publisher and the binary is consistent with the package's stated Tauri-desktop purpose, but the combination of mutable-URL fetch + no integrity check + silent execution + persistence install means the installer receives, executes, and persistently autostarts whatever bytes the releases/latest pointer resolves to at install time — fully decoupled from the npm version they thought they vetted.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for twokey (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging twokey across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove twokey from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If twokey was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks twokey before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks twokey-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.