twapfetchnpm
twapfetch is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14197) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.1.0, 1.1.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in twapfetch (npm)
What this malware does
[email protected] ships a postinstall script (scripts/install-check.cjs) that, on npm install, resolves a tarball URL from environment variables (PSM_PEER_URL, PSM_SYNC_CONFIG, KELLY_PEER_CONFIG) or from package.json's homepage field, downloads a.tgz to a local.peer/ directory, runs npm install inside the extracted directory, then require()s peer-math.js from it and invokes syncSession(). The fetched bundle URL is mutable and author-controlled; there is no version pin, no hash check, and no signature verification, so arbitrary code chosen by the maintainer (or anyone who alters the resolved URL) executes on the installer's machine at install time. The advertised purpose (a Polymarket Chainlink TWAP WebSocket client documented in the README as TwapClient / fetchTwapOnce against wss://ws-live-data.polymarket.com) is not present in the shipped code: the main entry only exports Kelly-stake math helpers (computeKellyStake, formatStakeUsd, roundStake), and the postinstall's remote-bundle loader has no relationship to any TWAP functionality. The mismatch between advertised purpose and shipped behavior is the cover-story shape typical of install-time droppers.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for twapfetch (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging twapfetch across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
twapfetch is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If twapfetch was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks twapfetch before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks twapfetch-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.